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Introduction

The history of antitrust law and labor has not been pretty.
The Sherman Act was passed at a time when the labor movement was
feared as much as admired.1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., captured the
sentiment in his 1897 address to the Boston University Law School,
five years before he was appointed to the Supreme Court.2 “When
socialism first began to be talked about,” he observed, “the
*

James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Carey Law
School and The Wharton School. Thanks to Erik Hovenkamp & Ioana
Marinescu for comments.
1

See, e.g., JOHN MITCHELL, ORGANIZED LABOR: ITS PROBLEMS, PURPOSES
AND IDEALS AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN WAGE
EARNERS 176-186 (1903); James A. Emery, Labor Organizations and the
Sherman Law, 20 J. POL. ECON. 599 (1912); Richard J. Hinton, American
Labor Organizations, 140 N. AM. REV. 48 (1885). A somewhat more
sympathetic retrospective is SOLOMON BLUM, LABOR ECONOMICS (1925).
2
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
1
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comfortable classes of the community were a good deal frightened.”3
He suspected that this fear drove judicial attitudes about the working
class in both England and the United States.4 The public at the time
was divided on the issue of how antitrust policy should address
organized labor.
After lengthy debate the Sherman Act had been passed in
1890, one vote short of unanimous, but without an explicit labor
immunity. Senator John Sherman favored it and actually drafted
proposed language.5 Some Progressives argued that Congress really
intended to include an immunity, or else that it was implied, but
neither the text nor legislative history supports that view.6 In any
event, Senator Sherman’s unsuccessful attempt at an amendment
concedes his own belief that immunizing language would have been
necessary.

3

Id. at 467.
Ibid.
5
Senator John Sherman proposed that “this act shall not be construed to
apply to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations between
laborers….” 21 Cong. Rev. 2612 (1890). That language had been approved
on a voice vote but did not survive the subsequent Senate markup. One
interesting account of the legislative history, including some consideration
of the potential for laborers to be antitrust plaintiffs, is Peter R. Dickson and
Philippa K. Wells, The Dubious Origins of the Sherman Act: the Mouse that
Roared, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 3, 10 (2001) (describing Mississippi
Democrat Senator James Z. George’s unsuccessful efforts to include farmer
and laborer class actions against trusts).
6
Samuel Gompers, The Hatters’ Case: The Sherman Law—Amend it or End
it, 17 AM. FEDERATIONIST 197 (1902); Louis B. Boudin, The Sherman Act
and Labor Disputes, 39 Col. L. Rev. 1283 (1939). See also EDWARD
BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT (1930). Berman also cited
interviews with Senator Sherman in which he stated his personal belief that
the statute was not intended to reach labor combinations. Id. 5. Archibald
Cox, the most influential antitrust and labor scholar of the mid-twentieth
century, found the Sherman Act debate inconclusive. Archibald Cox, Labor
and the Antitrust Laws – A Preliminary Analysis, 104 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
252 (1955).
4
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The consensus among prominent antitrust scholars of the day
was that the Act was intended to treat combinations of capital and
combinations of labor in the same way.7 Arthur Jerome Eddy, one of
the most prominent early Sherman Act treatise writers, referred to
any notion that labor combinations should be treated more gently
than combinations of capital as a “manifest injustice, not to say
absurdity,” whose errors should appeal to “every fair-minded man.”8
A poll taken among the broadly selected members of the Chicago
Conference on Trusts in 18999 produced 554 respondents and
indicated that roughly 2/3 believed that the Act had not been intended
to immunize labor, but rather to treat labor and capital in the same
way.10
The Gilded Age Supreme Court could not have been clearer.
It turned the powerful equity provisions of the Sherman Act, which
gave the government broad authority to enjoin antitrust violations,11
into an effective strike-breaking tool.12 The Act thus weaponized and
7

See J. JOYCE, A TREATISE ON MONOPOLIES AND UNLAWFUL
COMBINATIONS OR RESTRAINTS 175 (1911); WILLIAM WHEELER
THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT 1-31 (1913);
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT 97 (1914); 2 ARTHUR J EDDY THE LAW OF COMBINATIONS:
EMBRACING MONOPOLIES, TRUSTS, AND COMBINATIONS OF LABOR AND
CAPITAL 1330-1331 (1901); Emery, Labor Organizations and the Sherman
Law, 20 J. POL. ECON. 599, 608 (1912).
8
EDDY, id. at 1331.
9
CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON TRUSTS: SPEECHES, DEBATES
RESOLUTIONS, LIST OF THE DELEGATES, COMMITTEES, ETC.,
SEP. 13-16, 1899 (Civic Fed. Of Chicago 1900).
10
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Invention of Antitrust, __USC L. REV. __, *7
(2022) (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995502.
11
Section 4 of the original Sherman Act authorized the federal courts “to
prevent and restrain violations of this Act,” and commanded U.S. attorneys
“to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such
violations….” Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
12
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908) (relying on labor and product
market cases interchangeably); United States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698 (N.D.
Cal. 1895); Irving v. Neal, 209 F. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v.
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expanded upon a loose aggregation of common law tort theories that
had previously been used to enjoin strikes.13 Only in 1895, after the
Sherman Act had been passed, did the Supreme Court authorize a
federal anti-labor injunction directly under the Commerce Clause.14
With passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, Progressives
attempted to right the balance in favor of labor. The language of §6
of that Act15 -- that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce” – should have taken labor out of antitrust law
altogether, particularly in a Supreme Court that was construing the
Commerce Clause very narrowly.16 The statute was a severe
disappointment, however.17 An anguished Alpheus T. Mason,
Brandeis’ eventual biographer,18 concluded that the Court’s
interpretation of the Clayton Act dashed any hope that labor union
activities would come to be treated as legitimate.19 University of
Chicago economist J. Stanley Christ believed that the Clayton Act
had, if anything, expanded the power of the courts to enjoin labor
disputes.20 University of California labor economist Solomon Blum
Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans 54 F. 994 (E.D.La.
1893).
13
E.g, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met) 111 (1842) (applying tort
theory and refusing to sustain an indictment charging bootmakers with
conspiring to obtain higher wages).
14
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 598, 600 (1895) (sustaining injunction when
much of the conduct was independently criminal, including “forcible
obstructions of the highways along which interstate commerce travels”;
unnecessary to decide whether jurisdiction was appropriate under the
Sherman Act as well).
15
15 U.S.C. §17 (2018).
16
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.”)
17
Particularly in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443
(1921). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law,
1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919, 963-965 (1988).
18
ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE (1956).
19
Alpheus T. Mason, The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act, 18 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 489 (1924).
20
J. Stanley Christ, The Federal Courts and Organized Labor, 5 J. Bus. 103
(1932).
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lamented that “never … have higher hopes been wrecked by judicial
interpretation.”21 In their book on the labor injunction, Felix
Frankfurter and Nathan Greene argued for stricter statutory limits on
judicial power to enjoin strikes.22
Labor fared much better under the Roosevelt Court and the
more expansive efforts of the New Deal, particularly the antiinjunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932.23 A little
later came judicial creation of the so-called “nonstatutory immunity,”
which broadly exempts collective bargaining about wages, hours, and
conditions of employment. The expansion was termed “nonstatutory”
because the Clayton Act did not expressly immunize non-labor
entities. Nevertheless, an effective immunity would have to cover
both sides of a collective bargaining agreement.24 Under it, the
immunity is extended to collective bargaining agreements between
labor and employers, and also to bargained-for restraints in output
markets for products and services.
For example, in Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO v.
Jewel Tea Co.,25 the Supreme Court immunized a collective
bargaining agreement between a retailer and unionized butchers that
limited the hours of operation of the stores’ meat departments. Justice
Douglas dissented, objecting that the collective bargaining agreement
in question was an “obvious restraint on the product market.”26

21

BLUM, LABOR ECONOMICS, supra note __ at 97.
FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
23
29 U.S.C. §§101-115. See United States v Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219
(1941) (interpreting Norris-LaGuardia Act to preclude most labor
injunctions).
24
The exemption was first explicitly recognized in Connell Constr. Co., Inc.
v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975), although it had been
applied earlier in Jewel Tea, infra. See Hiba Hafiz, Structural Labor
Rights, 119 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2021).
25
381 U.S. 676 (1965).
26
Id. at 735-737 (Douglas, j., dissenting, joined by Justices Black and
Clark). See also Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington
22

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015834

6

Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare Antitrust

2022

Further, an agreement among two store owners to restrict their hours
would have been per se unlawful under the antitrust laws, and the
immunity did not apply to product sellers.27
Product market restraints of the kind approved in Jewel Tea
follow as a matter of course from the collective bargaining process.
The nonstatutory immunity applies to collective bargaining
agreements pertaining to “wages, hours, and working conditions.”28
If a labor contract closes the shop to nonunion employees and also
specifies that covered employees can work only from 9AM to 5PM,
the agreement effectively restrains output in the product market. The
immunity has even been extended to collective bargaining
agreements that involve multiple employers, as are common in sports
leagues.29
During the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s and 1980s the
political and economic position of labor went into sharp eclipse.
Subsequent to that the labor share of the returns to economic
production has declined significantly.30 The rediscovery of labor
interests in the 2010s represents a reversal once again.

and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317 (1966) (noting impact of collective
bargaining on product output).
27
Cf. Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Economics, 38 STAN. L. REV.
991, 997 (“a constraint in the labor market necessarily leads to a constraint
in the product market.”).
28
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689 (“Employers and their unions are required to
bargain about wages, hours and working conditions, and this fact weighs
heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for agreements on these subjects”).
29
Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). See also Newspaper
Drivers Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 923 (1969) (two newspapers collectively bargaining with a union
could agree that if one was struck on certain issues the other would cease
publication as well).
30
For good evaluations of a large literature, see Matthias Kehrig & Nicolas
Vincent, The Micro-Level Anatomy of the Labor Share Decline, 136 Q. J.
ECON. 1031 (2021); Gene M.Grossman & Ezra Oberfield, The Elusive
Explanation for the Declining Labor Share (NBER, Aug. 2021, working
paper #29165), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w29165.
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This revival of antitrust’s interest in labor is noteworthy
because it treats labor as a victim of anticompetitive restraints, not as
a perpetrator as the earlier antitrust law treated them. Even the large
expansion of union rights that occurred after the New Deal was
concerned primarily with defining a labor “immunity,” which is
something that applies to potential defendants. Today labor interests
are on the antitrust offensive.
The problem of protecting labor from anticompetitive
restraints imposed by employers is not lack of statutory coverage.
The Sherman Act’s more general coverage and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which applies to mergers, already proscribe the relevant
anticompetitive effects in all markets. They apply equally to sellers
and purchasers, including purchasers of labor.31 Anti-poaching
agreements or other forms of collusion in wage markets are already
unlawful,32 and the Justice Department can and has used its criminal
enforcement power against them.33 Mergers that suppress wages are
also covered.
To be sure, the history of applying these statutes so as to
protect labor is much thinner than antitrust intervention in product
31

E.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001) (then Judge
Sotomayor on Second Circuit, sustaining §1 complaint alleging unlaw
exchanges of salary information).
32
E.g., United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., 2011 WL 2636850 (D.D.C. June 3,
2011); United States v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 2011 WL 10883994 (D.D.C. Mar.
18, 2011).
33
Antitrust Division USDOJ and FTC, Antitrust Guidance for Human
Resource
Professionals
(Oct.
2016),
available
at
www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511. See also United States v. Surgical Care
Affiliates, LLC and SCAI Holdings, LLC (announcement of indictment,
July 8, 2021), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-surgicalcare-affiliates-llc-and-scai-holdings-llc. See “DOJ Gears up for First-Ever
Criminal Labor Antitrust Trials,” CPI INT’L (April 4, 2022), available at
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/doj-gears-up-for-firstcriminal-labor-antitrust-trials/. Some states are also getting into the act.
See, e.g., State by Raoul v. Elite Staffing, Inc., __ N.E.2d __, 2022 WL
1819541 (Ill. App. June 3, 2022) (Illinois antitrust act condemns horizontal
anti-poaching agreement under per se rule).
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markets, but that is not a result of any imbalance in the statutory
language. As a result, proposals of statutory amendments that do
such things as make the merger laws apply to monopsony, or buyer
side power as well as the seller side,34 do not add anything to
substantive coverage. The coverage has always been there. They
may serve to remind courts, however, that labor market restraints
require more attention than they have received in the past.
Wages and the Value of Labor

In the late nineteenth century economists began to reject the
pre-marginalist and severely anti-interventionist “wage-fund”
doctrine that had dominated classical political economy until John
Stuart Mill famously recanted it in 1869.35 The doctrine, a British
creation that was more popular in the United States than in the United
Kingdom, was hostile to both minimum wages laws and labor
unions.36 It posited that surplus capital from previous business cycles
provided a “fund” from which current wages must be paid. Wages
paid in excess of the fund would drive the firm to ruin.
The rise and dominance of marginalism in economics
promised a theory much more favorable to the worker, although the
Supreme Court clung to some version of the wages-fund into the

34

E.g., see Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act
(proposed Feb. 4, 2021), available at Senator Klobuchar Introduces
Sweeping Bill to Promote Competition and Improve Antitrust Enforcement
- News Releases - U.S. Senator Amy Klobuchar (senate.gov).
35
John Stuart Mill, Book Review, in 5 COLLECTED WORKS 680 (J. Robson
ed. 1967) (reviewing WILLIAM T. THORNTON, ON LABOUR, ITS WRONGFUL
CLAIMS AND RIGHTFUL DUES, ITS ACTUAL PRESENT AND POSSIBLE
FUTURE (1869). On Mill’s recantation, see Arthur C. Pigou, Mill and the
Wages Fund, 59 ECON. J. 171 (1949); Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., A Short-Run
Classical Model of Capital and Wages: Mill’s Recantation of the Wages
Fund, 28 OXFORD ECON PAP. 66 (1976).
36
On the wage-fund doctrine in United States wage policy, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 379, 431-438 (1988).
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1920s.37 The dispute over the theory of wages is central to the
distinction between classical political economy, which developed
theories of value mainly from past averages; and neoclassical
economics, with its forward-looking concept of rational decision
making at the margin. Under this conception the rate of wages
depended on the laborer’s expected contribution.
As early American marginalist John Bates Clark observed, in
competitive equilibrium a worker should realize his or her expected
marginal contribution to production as wages.38 What counts is not
previously paid-up capital but rather the expectation of future
production. That number is the equivalent of marginal cost pricing
for products: in equilibrium a competitive firm increases output until
the anticipated incremental revenue from each sale equals the
increment in cost. In a competitive employment market, wages
should rise to the point that each employee receives the marginal
value of his or her production.
Employer monopsony power in the labor market drives
returns below that level, however, and today those numbers seem
grim.39 In fact, workers in the United States receive, on average, 65

Id. at 403-404, 437 (discussing Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S.
525 (1923). See also FREDERICK W. TAUSSIG, WAGES AND CAPITAL: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE WAGES FUND DOCTRINE (1900) (attempting to
adopt the wages fund doctrine and make it consistent with marginalist
economics).
38
JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY OF
WAGES, INTEREST AND PROFITS 346-348 (1908). More conservative
economists resisted this approach. See, e.g,, SOLOMON BLUM, LABOR
ECONOMICS 436-438 (1925) (finding the marginal productivity theory of
wages to be “meaningless”). Blum also rejected marginalism as a useful
economic tool. See id. at 440.
39
See generally Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum, & Bledi
Taska, Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy
Data, Appendix A, 66 LABOUR ECONOMICS 101866 (2020).
37
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cents for every dollar of value that they create.40 In many areas
workers are severely underpaid in relation to their production.
These effects of monopsony power in labor markets show up
in some simple although perhaps counterintuitive ways. For example,
if workers were being paid their marginal product a forced wage
increase should lead to less production. However, if they are
systematically paid less than their marginal product and a wage
increase still places them below that level, then that wage increase
will have a smaller effect on the amount of work that is demanded.
To illustrate, if a worker contributes $20 to the employers’ product
and minimum wage laws increase her wage from $10 to $14, the
worker is still valuable to the employer. In the simple case there
might be no reduction in employment at all because this is simply an
inframarginal wealth transfer.41 By contrast, if the increased
minimum wage crosses the marginal productivity line, then both
product and labor output will decrease. For example, if a worker’s
marginal productivity is $12/hour and the wage increases from $10 to
$14, employers will reduce the amount of labor that they purchase
and, ceteris paribus, also the amount of product that they produce.
Thus any serious debate about the impact of raising the minimum
wage must consider where currents wages lie in relation to the
marginal productivity of the labor that is involved.
40

Chen Yeh, Claudia Macaluso, & Brad Hershbein, Monopsony in U.S.
Labor Markets, AM. ECON. REV. (2022) (forthcoming), available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1dO9Q0EthLTAV4O4QNrMCyFF9Y0Msqwm/view.
See also David Berger, Kyle
Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey, Labor Market Power, 112 AM. ECON.
REV. 1147 (2022); Orley C. Ashenfelter, David Card, Henry S. Farber &
Michael Ransom, Monopsony in the Labor Market: New Empirical Results
and New Public Policies (NBER working paper #29522, Nov. 2021),
available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w29522 (summarizing numerous
recent papers on the issue).
41
See José Azar, Emiliano Huet-Vaughn, Ioana Marinescu, Bledi Taska &
Till von Wachter, Minimum Wage Employment Effects and Labor Market
Concentration (NBER Working paper, July 2019), available at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26101.
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These numbers are averages, however, and the average
disguises the range of difference among workers, including the extent
to which workers are employed at the margin. In fact, the marginalist
rejection of the wage-fund doctrine was not quite as clean a victory
for legislative intervention as some early Progressives believed.
Instead, it served to divide economists on the question. For example,
Chicago School economist George J. Stigler argued strongly in the
1940s that statutory minimum wage laws created more poverty than
they corrected.42
As was well known by the early twentieth century, more
marginal workers or more marginal activities will be affected by a
mandated wage increase.43 This outcome can be consistent with the
proposition that demand for labor falls off when the minimum wage
is increased, but that the overall effects might be small.44 The size of
the falloff depends on the relative number of marginal and
inframarginal workers. More precisely, however, it depends on the
number of marginal and inframarginal units of labor. For example,
an employer might respond to a mandatory wage increase, not by
terminating employees but by reducing their hours or reassigning
them.
Marginal labor is affected because a statutory wage increase
would make it unprofitable to the employer. Inframarginal work, by
42

George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum Wage Legislation, 36 AM.
ECON. REV. 358 (1946).
43
See, e.g., Frederick W. Taussig, Minimum Wages for Women, 30 Q.J.
ECON. 411 (1926) (considering whether lower wages for women were
explained by lower marginal productivity); James E. Le Rossignol, Some
Phases of the Minimum Wage Question, 7 AM. ECON. REV. 251 (1917);
George G. Groat, Economic Wage and Legal Wage, 33 YALE L.J. 489
(1924); Paul H. Douglas, The Effect of Wage Increases Upon Employment,
29 AM. ECON. REV. 138 (1939). On Progressive economists and the
problem of gender discrimination in wages, see Robert E. Prasch,
Retrospectives: American Economists in the Progressive Era on the
Minimum Wage, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 221 (1999).
44
See Richard A. Ippolito, The Impact of the Minimum Wage if Workers
Can Adjust Effort, 46 J.L. & Econ. 207, 207-208 (2003).
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contrast, will simply earn more. Willie A. Lyons, a 21-year-old
elevator operator at the Congress Hotel in Washington, D.C., was
very likely becoming a marginal worker. Self-service elevators were
just being introduced in the 1920s, making her job increasingly
vulnerable. When the D.C. minimum wage law was imposed the
Hotel dispensed with her services and switched to self-service. She
lost her job and successfully challenged the law to the Supreme
Court.45
The Relationship between Labor Markets and Product Markets

Returns to labor are strongly linked to what is happening in
the product market. Employers have traditionally treated wage
laborers as a variable cost. Some Progressives and Institutionalist
labor economists such as John R. Commons objected to this
treatment. Commons observed that plants and machinery actually
received better treatment than labor did. When a factory reduced
production, it continued to maintain buildings and machinery and
make payments on purchase obligations for durable equipment.
Employees at will, by contrast, were immediately let go.46
The demand for labor is almost entirely derivative of product
output. Firms that do not produce anything on the output side do not
require labor on the input side. Further, labor is largely a variable
cost, particularly at the lower end of the scale where it is
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923). Plaintiff Willie
Lyons’ situation was treated more fully by the lower court. See Children’s
Hospital of D.C. v. Adkins, 284 F.613, 614-618 (D.C. Cir. 1922). For more
on the litigation, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 1836-1937 at 77-78 (1991); Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence
of Equality: The Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights
Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 1905-1923, 78 J. AM. HIST.
188 (1991).
46
See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 283312 (1924). For elaboration, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law
& Economics Movement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 993, 1010-1011 (1990).
Employers are also likely to exclude other social costs, which are more
likely to be invariant to output, at least in the short run. See Robert E.
Prasch, The Social Cost of Labor, 39 J. ECON. ISSUES 439 (2005).
45
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compensated mainly by hourly wages. As a result, the demand for
labor as an input is closely correlated with the amount of product or
service output that the firm is generating. As product output goes up,
ceteris paribus, the demand for labor goes up as well and typically in
rough proportion.
Assuming that labor is a variable cost proportioned equally
over output, a thirty-percent output reduction in product output would
be accompanied by a thirty-percent reduction in labor. Incidentally,
it would also lead to a thirty-percent reduction in the supply of
nonlabor components, but suppliers of these have their own need for
labor, which would be reduced proportionately as well.
When product market output is strong and demand is
growing, the fortunes of labor rise as well. Here, consumers are very
largely in the driver’s seat. They make purchase choices, which in
turn determine demand and thus the need for labor. So labor rides on
consumer choice. Any evaluation of antitrust’s role in the welfare of
workers must also consider its role in product markets. A practice
that reduces product market production will injure workers just as it
injures consumers.
Actions that result in reduced output in product markets can
cause labor as much harm as restraints that are directed at labor
markets. That can be true of both single-firm monopolists and cartels.
Further, a product market output reduction that results from an
antitrust rule is likely to be more harmful than one that results from
private conduct. When a firm or cartel exercises market power on
either side, the result is suppression of output for that particular firm
or cartel. By contrast, an antitrust rule that results in reduced output
does so over the entire range of sellers subject to that rule. This
increases the probability of price-affecting output reductions.
To the extent that harmful antitrust legislation such as the
Robinson-Patman Act47 or the per se rule against maximum resale
47

15 U.S.C. §13.
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price maintenance48 resulted in lower output the impact could be felt
across all of American retailing. The same thing would result from a
return to aggressive per se rules against vertical integration by merger
or contract –largely based on a nostalgic belief that the country was
better off when manufacturers sold FOB to dealers, who then set their
own pricing and distribution rules.49 The same thing could result
from overly aggressive rules against predatory pricing that foist
higher prices and reduced output in both retail and wholesale
markets. This is not to say that current predation rules should not be
rewritten; there are good reasons that they should be. But
overdeterrence here can be at just as costly as underdeterrence, and
harms consumers and labor equally.50
The Changing Relationship Between Labor and Antitrust

The relationship between labor and antitrust policy has
changed over time in two important ways. First, as noted above, was
the migration of labor from being a target of antitrust law to being a
protected class. The field that we characterize as “labor and
antitrust” was historically dominated by issues in which labor
interests appeared in court as defendants. The relevant question was
whether there should be an “immunity” for labor organizing
activities, which of course protects potential defendants. That field
attracted such luminaries as Archibald Cox, who wrote extensively
about the antitrust immunity for collective bargaining.51 Initially the
protections were oriented toward simple strikes or concerted refusals
48

Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled, State Oil Co.
v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
49
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle
Imperiled, 45 J. CORP., L. 65, 84-86 (2019).
50
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary
Pricing: A Critical Journal, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 209 (2015).
51

Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337
(1972); Archibald Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws – a Preliminary
Analysis, 104 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 252 (1955); Archibald Cox, Federalism in
the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
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to deal that could be addressed as combinations in restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act. A little later the immunity was extended to
cover such things as collective bargaining over hours or limitations
on contractors’ power to hire non-union sub-contractors. What these
cases have in common is that labor showed up as a defendant, and the
question was whether the antitrust immunity would save it.52
Today the orientation has flipped. Most of the recent
literature focuses on the protection of labor from anticompetitive
restraints imposed by employers.53 The emerging antitrust question is
not antitrust immunity for antitrust violations committed by labor, but
rather labor protection from antitrust violations committed by
employers. The anticompetitive behaviors include horizontal wage
fixing54 and anti-poaching agreements, as well as vertical
noncompete agreements that limit employee mobility55 and mergers
that have output limiting effects in both product and labor markets.
A second feature of the labor/antitrust relationship is that this
rising antitrust protection for labor has been very largely limited to
restraints that occur in labor markets themselves. That is, whether
the challenged practice originated with employers or labor, the
principal purpose or effect of the practice was to restrict or control
the output of labor and thus affect the competitiveness of the labor
market. This is true notwithstanding that limits on product output
can have negative effects on labor that are just as strong.
52

The developments, including case law, are treated in 1B PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶255-257 (5th ed.
2020).
53
E.g., ERIC A. POSNER, HOW ANTITRUST FAILED WORKERS (2021); Hiba
Hafiz, Labor Antitrust’s Paradox, 87 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 381 (2020).
54
E.g., Jien v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 2020 WL 5544183 (D.Md. Sep. 16, 2020)
(class action alleging large, industry-wide wage-fixing conspiracy for low
wage chicken processors).
55
E.g., see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the FTC: Franchise
Restraints on Worker Mobility (Promarket, Dec. 1, 2021), available at
https://promarket.org/2021/12/01/antitrust-ftc-franchise-worker-mobilitylabor/.
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While antitrust policy should certainly not lighten up its
protection of employees from labor market restraints, it must be more
attentive to competitive harms that befall labor from restraints that
reduce output in product markets. Antitrust restraints in product
markets can have important and harmful effects on labor, but under
existing law they do not often raise actionable antitrust issues.56
One limited exception to this rule is mergers. Merger law
does not make a distinction between product markets and labor
markets, or even between seller restraints and buyer restraints. The
thing it prohibits is acquisitions of the shares or assets of another firm
“where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.”57 Overwhelmingly the law of mergers
has focused on harms on the selling side of the market,58 but in fact
suppression of wages can be a motive for an anticompetitive merger
just as much as the ability to lift product prices. Indeed, the very fact
that anti-poaching agreements exist indicates that collaborative wage
suppression is profitable. Further, it can be just as effective if
produced by a merger as when it results from a cartel.
In some markets the source of merger profits is more likely to
be wage suppression rather than increases in product prices.59 For
example, on the output side hospital rates are heavily influenced by
health insurers or government purchasers who put downward
pressure on them. Nurses do not receive equivalent protection. They
can be particularly vulnerable when the number of effective
56

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
15 U.S.C. §18 (2018).
58
On the small number of buyer-side merger challenges, see 4A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶980-982 (4th ed.
2016).
59
See Aryeh Mellman, Measuring the Impact of Mergers on Labor
Markets, 55 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (2019). See also Abhay Aneja
& Prasad Krishnamurthy, Merger Deregulation, Wages, and Inequality:
Evidence
from
the
U.S.
Banking
Industry
(July
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4171249
(looser
enforcement of bank merger laws led to lower wages in that market).
57
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employers in a community is reduced as a result of a merger.60
Depending on circumstances, the real private gains to hospitals from
an anticompetitive merger may show up as reduced wages paid to
nurses rather than patient price increases.61
In other situations, largely ignored by the case law, a merger
of two firms may be harmless on the selling side but anticompetitive
on the hiring side. For example, consider the Pacific Northwest
logging industry that was the subject of a Supreme Court case
involving alleged predatory buying.62 Sawmills procure hardwood
logs in a local market because shipping costs are high in relation to
value. But the finished hardwood is sold to furniture manufacturers
in a national market. In that case a merger between two sawmills that
dominated the local market might harm wage competition in that
market, even though the chance of competitive harm in the resale
market is small. The predatory buying claim that the Weyerhaeuser
decision rejected is similar. The allegation were that the defendant
engaged in predatory overbuying of logs intending to drive other log
buyers out of the market.63 If successful it would have reduced the
purchases of logs in the region, and incidentally the amount of labor
needed to produce them.

60

Cf. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 381 (D.C.Cir., 2018) (J.
Kavanaugh, dissenting, arguing that court should have remanded to
consider the effect of merger on employees).
61
On employer monopsony power in markets for nursing, see Jordan D.
Matsudaira, Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from
Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 92 (2014);
Daniel Sullivan, Monopsony Power in the Market For Nurses, 32 J.L. &
ECON. S135 (1989).
62
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 539 U.S.
312 (2007). See Roger G. Noll, “Buyer Power” and Economic Policy, 72
ANTITRUST L.J. 589 (2005) (examining problem of manufacturers who
purchase inputs, including labor, in local markets but sell in regional or
national markets).
63
On such claims, see Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Predatory Buying
and the Antitrust laws, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 415 (2008).
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The same thing could be true of the sugar beet refiners in
another Supreme Court decision. They purchased sugar beets from
farmers in a local market, where they also fixed buying prices, but
resold refined sugar in a national market where they had little or no
market power.64 Here the farmer victims of the cartel were
independent contractors, not employees, but their injury was the
same.65
In any antitrust case raising the issues, buyer-side and sellerside competitive effects must both be addressed. Further, the
correlation between seller-side and buyer-side market concentration
is not very strong.66 In most cases one cannot be inferred from the
other. Over a wide range of employment activities, the extent of
competition on the two sides differs.
For example, a town with two hospitals is highly concentrated
in the market in which they deliver medical services. It may also be
highly concentrated in the market in which it hires nurses, who are
specialized. However, janitors, maintenance staff, clerical and other
support employees very likely compete over a much broader range of
employers. As a result, for example, we might predict that a merger
of the only two hospitals in a medium-sized town will have a
significant negative effect on competition in the market for nurses,
64

Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
65
See id. at 223-224, observing that the refiners controlled the supply of
seed, and were sufficiently concentrated that they were able to make take it
or leave it offers to farms to purchase their beets at low prices. Many of the
plaintiffs were farmers. See Supplemental Brief of Petitioners, 1947 WL
44290 (No. 75, U.S.S.Ct. Oct. Term, 1946).
66
Jose Azar, Ioana Marinescu, Marshall Steinbaum, & Bledi Taska,
Concentration in US Labor Markets: Evidence from Online Vacancy Data,
Appendix A, 66 LABOUR ECONOMICS 101866 (2020), Appendix A,
available
at
https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0927537120300907?token=948C
A033EC2A4F270B4FD881DFA7476C87C1C4E36C6FF48BADBAE79A8
4A3E355228CB208C687578DD5D8E4DE226E0722&originRegion=useast-1&originCreation=20220122123028.
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but not for secretaries, waitstaff, or janitors. These can work as
easily for non-hospital employers. Many manufacturers may be in an
analogous position with respect to geographic markets. They may
sell their product in a national market but hire unskilled and semiskilled workers in a local market. For example, a large Amazon
warehouse might recruit most of its employees in a local market,
even though the products are destined for national shipment.
Recent decisions have correctly noted that antitrust harm in
labor markets is independently actionable. That is, proving an
unlawful restraint in a labor market does not require independent
proof of harm in the related product market.67 Each can be harmed
independently, and under most antitrust laws buyer and seller harms
are covered equally, with two statutory exceptions. One exception is
§3 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits tying and exclusive dealing
and explicitly applies only to sellers or lessors.68 However, tying and
exclusive dealing can also be condemned under both provisions of
the Sherman Act, which apply to buyers and sellers alike.
The other exception is the Robinson-Patman Act, whose
principal liability provisions cover only someone who price
discriminates among “different purchasers.”69 That is, that portion of
the Act applies only to sellers. The Robinson Patman Act does
contain a separate buyers’ liability provision, but it is entirely
derivative; that is, it applies only when the seller violates the Act by

E.g., Alston vs. NCAA, 141 S.Ct. 2141, 2154 (2021) (“Nor does the
NCAA suggest that, to prevail, the plaintiff student-athletes must show that
its restraints harm competition in the seller-side (or consumer facing)
markets as well as in its buyer-side (or labor) market”), citing Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)
(condemning buy side cartel without inquiring into harm on output side of
market).
68
15 U.S.C. §14 (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person … to lease or
make a sale….”).
69
15 U.S.C. §13 (2018).
67

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015834

20

Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare Antitrust

2022

giving the buyer a discriminatorily low price.70 As a result, it has
rarely resulted in liability.71
In any event, labor is a service, and both of these sections of
the Clayton Act (although not the Clayton Act’s merger provision)
apply only to sales of “goods, wares, or commodities.”72 In 1914,
when the Clayton Act was passed, there appeared to be little
awareness that practices such as exclusive dealing could harm labor
as well as product sellers, and service markets as well as those for
more tactile products. The issue of labor market harm arises
occasionally, mainly with respect to limitations on nonunion labor
contained in collective bargaining agreements. These cases arise
entirely under the Sherman Act.73
Antitrust Output Effects in Product and Labor Markets: an Inverted “U”

The relationship between antitrust enforcement policy and
output in both product and labor markets is an inverted “U” like this:

70

Id., §13(f).
See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶2361 (4th ed. 2019).
72
See 15 U.S.C. §14 (“goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities”); 15 U.S.C. §13 (Robinson-Patman Act –
“commodities of like grade and quality”). The Robinson-Patman Act also
has a provision, 15 U.S.C. §13d, which covers the discriminatory provision
of services in connection with the processing or handling of products. For
example, a seller might violate the provision by offering to stock, shelf, or
advertise its products for free for some buyers but not others. See FTC v.
Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (condemning discriminatory
provision of promotional coupon initiative given to some supermarkets but
not others).
73
E.g., Connecticut Ironworkers Employers’ Assn. v. New England
Regional Council of Carpenters, 324 F.Supp.3d 293 (D. Ct. 2018)
(collective bargaining agreement limiting hiring to unionized
subcontractors a form of exclusive dealing; dismissed on the merits, not
under labor immunity).
71
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Neoliberal antitrust, such as that advocated by Robert Bork,
tended to support antitrust policies favoring lower output because of
its energetic protection of producer profits to the extent of including
them in its definition of “consumer welfare.”74 The result was higher
markups and lower output. On the other side, over-enforcement as is
sometimes associated with antitrust populism tends to favor lower
output because of its opposition to “bigness” and small business
protectionism. For example, calls to “break up” large digital
platforms are almost certainly calculated to result in lower product
output, perhaps significantly. Such breakups interfere with both
economies of scale or scope as well as the attainment of beneficial
network effects.75
The market for employment tracks these outcomes
consistently: moving antitrust policy either to the neoliberal right or
the populist left is bad for workers as well as consumers. Inverted
74

See discussion infra, text at notes __.
On the manifold sources of economies that accrue to large digital
platforms – namely, economies of scale, economies of scope, and network
effects – see Geoffrey Parker, Georgios Petropoulos, and Marshall Van
Alstyne, Digital Platforms and Antitrust (SSRN 2020), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608397;
Aneesh
Zutshi & Antonio Grilo, The Emergence of Digital Platforms: A
Conceptual Platform Architecture and Impact on Industrial Engineering,
136 COMPUTERS & INDUS. ENG’R 546 (2019), available at The Emergence
of Digital Platforms: A Conceptual Platform Architecture and impact on
Industrial Engineering - ScienceDirect.
75
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“U” situations such as this one impose burdens on the policy maker
to get it right – errors in either direction can be costly.
While the number of units of labor is roughly proportional to
the number of units of product, welfare effects can differ. That
depends on the amount of market power the affected firm has on each
side. For example, if the product market is concentrated or
completely covered by a restraint, the welfare effects of an output
reduction on the product side will be relatively high. Overall market
output will decline and prices will rise. By contrast, if the labor
market is highly competitive the welfare effects on that side will be
smaller or even minimal. In the economy as a whole, labor market
concentration is, if anything, greater than product market
concentration, particularly at the lower end of the wage scale.76 In
highly concentrated labor markets a substantial output reduction in
the product market can harm labor significantly.
Welfare tests based on the welfare tradeoff model for antitrust
have systematically underestimated welfare harm insofar as they
have ignored the impact on labor. As developed below, the
influential Williamson-Bork welfare tradeoff model, which Bork
appropriated but misnamed “consumer welfare,” took no account of
welfare effects in labor markets. Bork estimated the welfare effects
of an output-reducing restraint by looking at the traditional
deadweight loss that applies to product market monopoly. By
contrast, the “true” consumer welfare model, which looks only at
consumer welfare, is consistent with labor interests to the extent that
high output benefits both consumers and labor.77
Alternative antitrust models that prefer values other than
product output, such as protection of small business, also understate
76

See Azar, Marinescu, Steinbaum, & Taska, Concentration in US Labor
Markets, supra note __.
77
Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: the True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010).
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welfare harm. While lack of attentiveness to the labor effects of
product market restraints is an important deficiency in the BorkWilliamson tradeoff model, it is also one of populist antitrust’s
biggest blindspots. This is particularly true of aggressive structural or
behavioral remedies engineered for the protection of small business.
To the extent such actions lead to higher prices or reduced product
output, labor as well as consumers suffer.
Product Output and Worker Restraints

While labor’s interest in high product output is strong, it is
not without qualifications. As the Jewel Tea decision illustrates,78
some reductions in product output may be the consequence of
organized labor activity directed toward higher worker compensation
or better working conditions. When labor organizes in order to
obtain higher returns it tends to reduce output in product markets as
well as labor. The effect is to increase the compensation of benefitted
workers even though it may reduce the overall number of jobs. For
example, the reduction in meat distribution hours approved in Jewel
Tea decreased the total amount of employment in that department,
although it benefitted covered workers by increasing their own
surplus. In the more common product restraint case, worker and
consumer interests are more closely aligned. A simple product price
fix harms both consumers and workers. Workers are better off,
ceteris paribus, when the size of the product market increases.
Nevertheless, agreements among labor suppliers that tend to
reduce product market output require more individualized
examination. Some such arrangements are not covered by any labor
immunity because the affected participants are independent
contractors, such as licensed professionals. For example, in North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,79 the Court struck
78

Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965). See discussion supra, text at notes __.
79
574 U.S. 494 (2015). Cf. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (“state
action” antitrust immunity precluded claim that Arizona used state bar
exam to cartelize lawyer market by limiting the number of students who

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4015834

24

Hovenkamp, Worker Welfare Antitrust

2022

down a dental association rule that forbad non-dentists from
whitening teeth. Removal of the ban would decrease compensation
for the dentist defendants, but it would increase the compensation of
dental hygienists, cosmetologists and other non-dentists who would
now be allowed into the market. Overall output would increase.
The Dental case illustrates a common problem with
professional licensing restraints: they do in fact increase the
compensation of benefitted suppliers, but typically do so by
excluding alternative lower compensation suppliers, such as the
various non-dentists who had been willing to whiten teeth at a lower
price. As a result, it is hardly clear that these decisions striking down
the occupational restrictions were bad for suppliers overall. Rather,
they were bad for the particular participating members who
benefitted from these restraints. To this extent they resemble
boycotts, tying or exclusive dealing in antitrust product markets: the
offense tends to increase the defendants’ own sales by excluding
others from the market. At the same time, however, it reduces
overall market output.
The supplier interest in North Caroline Dental was in
protecting individual compensation of the organized dentists, not in
limiting the number of patients who purchased teeth whitening
services. If overall patient demand increased, the dentists would
have profited even under the ban on non-dentist whitening. By
contrast, in a simple product cartel case such as Actavis, which
involved a market division agreement among pharmaceutical
manufacturers, no accommodation is required.80 With the pay-fordelay settlement removed, drug prices would drop and product output
would rise. Both consumers and workers would benefit.

passed).
Contrast Confederacion Hipica de Puerto Rico, Inc. v.
Confederacion de Jinetes Puertorriquenos, Inc., 30 F.4th 306 (1st Cir. 2022)
(jockeys fell on the labor side of the line and were lawfully entitled to strike
even though they were selling their services as independent contractors).
80
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013).
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Measuring Welfare Effects: Consumers and Workers

Antitrust policy should create incentives that enable markets
to achieve their highest realistically sustainable output. The word
“sustainable” is important because predatory pricing and related
strategies can include limited periods of even higher output, but these
strategies are not sustainable in the long run. Eventually the firm will
have to raise its prices and output will go down. Competitive
markets, by contrast, offer high and sustainable output. A focus on
output generally maximizes both consumer and labor welfare and
minimizes product market prices.81
Output effects are almost always easier to estimate than
economic welfare effects.82 Consumer welfare is a function of output
multiplied by the surplus customers receive on each transaction.
Worker welfare is generally measured by the difference between a
worker’s marginal contribution, which is the competitive rate of
wages, and the worker’s actual wage. By contrast, output is simply a
count of transactions or events themselves – such things as units or
pounds of production or hours or labor. To be sure, coming up with
and applying a particular unit of output may impose difficulties.
Quantity, quality, and innovation must all be counted as a form of
output. Further, the relevant output is that of the market, not that of
any particular firm or association. But welfare measurement would
include all of these and then require additional information about any
changes in the amount of surplus. So output effects are almost
always easier to measure than welfare effects.
Also important is the fact that an antitrust tribunal need not
determine competitive market output but only the likely output
81

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, 99 WASH. UNIV.
L. REV. 787 (2021).
82
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Slogans and Goals of Antitrust Law (Upenn
Working Paper, 15 July 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4121866 (antitrust
experts almost never measure welfare; rather they measure changes in
output or changes in price).
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effects of a particular challenged practice. Antitrust uses market
power requirements or per se rules to draw inferences about effects
on market wide output. The existence of market power makes an
anticompetitive output reduction plausible. At that point we must
identify qualifying anticompetitive practices that enable us to
establish an inference of a market output reduction. Here, direct
measures from econometric data are usually superior although they
have produced some judicial resistance and the data needed for
applying them are not always available.83
In a few situations welfare can go down even as market
output increases, or vice-versa.84 Whether these phenomena are
sufficiently robust to affect antitrust fact finding is doubtful. To the
best of my knowledge no court has ever even attempted to do so.
Here, the perfect can be the enemy of the good.
While welfare losses are much more difficult to assess than
changes in output, sometimes we can at least place a lower bound on
them. For example, if a cartel reduces output from 140 units to 100
units and exacts a $3/unit overcharge, the injury to consumer welfare
is at least $300, or the 100 units of actual purchases multiplied by the
$3 price increase. Assuming there are no offsets, the welfare losses
83

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV.
437 (2010); Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (2014); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm, 6
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 283 (1988). On litigation applications, see 2B
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (5th
ed. 2021).
84
As in William S. Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 5
REV. INDUS. ORG. 99, 107 (1990); William S. Comanor & John B.
Kirkwood, Resale Price Maintenance and Antitrust Policy, 3 CONTEMP.
POL’Y ISSUES 9, 12 (1985) (situations where a vertical restraint such as
resale price maintenance might increase output but reduce welfare because
it reaches more low value customers). See generally John M. Newman, The
Output-Welfare Fallacy: A Modern Antitrust Paradox, 107 IOWA L. REV.
563 (2022) (identifying situations in which output and welfare may move in
opposite directions).
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must be at least that large. That number clearly understates the
welfare effects of this cartel, because it completely ignores the
deadweight loss. To measure that, we need to know the amount of
the output reduction caused by the cartel and then something about
the shape of the demand curve in the area over the lost output. Those
numbers would be extraordinarily difficult to measure, and in any
event they are not relevant to antitrust litigation. For example, in
cartel damages actions the important numbers are the size of the
overcharge and the amount that the injured plaintiffs purchased. The
size of the deadweight loss is irrelevant.
In other cases we can estimate lost investment, which is a
pure deadweight loss. For example, suppose dominant firm A drives
competitor B out of the market by filing a patent infringement suit on
a fraudulently obtained patent.85 B’s destroyed investment (less
salvage value) is a deadweight loss, and this would be a lower limit
on the welfare loss as well. That information rarely gives us anything
useful about the social cost of the resulting monopoly. B’s losses
could be the same whether or not A’s infringement suit ever
succeeded in creating a monopoly.
The same thing is true in reverse about cost-reducing
practices such as those that give rise to an efficiency defense in
merger cases. In some cases we may be able to put a number on both
the magnitude of the cost savings and the number of units to which it
applies. But measuring the net welfare gain or loss from the merger
would be heroic in most cases, and the Government’s Merger
Guidelines do not require that. Rather they impose what amounts to
a price/output test: any efficiencies must be at least large enough to
offset any predicted price increase. A qualifying efficiency is one
that would not result in reduced output or higher prices in any

85

E.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965); see 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶704-706 (5th ed. 2022) (in press).
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market.86 Significantly, the Merger Guidelines never once speak of
welfare, but only of price and output.
Measurement of worker welfare is even less tractable because
we do not have a good equivalent to marginal cost. For most product
production, the measurement of marginal cost is an engineering
problem and can be inferred from the firm’s variable costs. In a
perfectly competitive labor market in equilibrium, wages are thought
to gravitate toward the worker’s marginal product, or the amount of
value that the worker produces.87 Recent empirical work suggests
that labor on the whole is receiving significantly less than its
marginal product, implying that employers overall have some
monopsony power.88
Labor’s Interest in High Product Output

Robert Bork corrupted the term “consumer welfare” by giving
it a meaning that included producer profits in its definition. As a
result, even some Justices on the Supreme Court have been able to
proclaim that antitrust’s goal is “consumer welfare” while yet

86

See USDOJ and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §10 (2010), available
at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010.
87
E.g. Janet L. Yellen, Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. 200 (1984); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Minimum
Wage Legislation, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 358 (1946). For some of the
constraints on measurement, see Robert H. Frank, Are Workers Paid their
Marginal Products?, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 549 (1984). For a review of the
literature see Alan Manning, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Review, 74
ILR
REV.
3
(2020),
available
at
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0019793920922499.
88
See, e.g., Wyatt J. Brooks, et al., Exploitation of Labor? Classical
Monopsony Power and Labor’s Share, 150 J. Dev. Econ. 1 (2021); Jose
Azar, Ioana Marinescu, and Marshall Steinbaum, Labor Market
Concentration
(NBER,
2017),
available
at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24147
(inferring
monopsony
from
concentration data).
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Underlying Bork’s approach was his belief that eventually
excess profits would be competed away and accrue to consumers.
There is little evidence that this regularly happens, however, even
when one looks over the entire period stretching back to the 1970s
and 1980s when Bork was writing.90 Over time price-cost margins
have not fallen. Rather, they have increased significantly.91 Of
course, individual firms might eventually see high markups being
competed away, but that can take a long time and the overall trend of
price-cost margins gives us little reason to be optimistic.
One of the most damaging features of the welfare-tradeoff
model, which Bork misnamed consumer welfare, was its toleration of
significant output reductions in the name of efficiency. He illustrated
an antitrust practice that both increased market power and reduced
costs, such as a merger or joint venture. This “naïve” model, which
he borrowed from economist Oliver E. Williamson,92 accepted the
traditional deadweight loss triangle as the social cost of monopoly
and also illustrated the offsetting cost reductions. Under the model
the practice was harmless on balance if the size of the per unit cost
savings exceeded the size of the deadweight loss.
89

See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating consumer welfare principle, but would have approved
pay-for-delay pharmaceutical settlement that raised consumer prices
significantly); Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018)
(declaring consumer welfare principle while approving anti-steering rule
that raised consumer prices in every situation where it applied). See Erik
Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713 (2018).
90
Mainly ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF (1978).
91
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Error Costs, __ UNIV. PA. J. BUS. L.
(2022)
(forthcoming),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3853282.
92
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). Id. at 20-21 (characterizing
model as “naïve”).
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In Bork’s illustration the practice in question reduced output
by roughly one half. 93 The actual size of the output reduction could
be either smaller or larger, depending on the shape of the demand
curve and the magnitude of the efficiencies. Neither Williamson nor
Bork addressed the important policy question whether the real world
contains any mergers or other practices that actually reduce costs so
much even as they also reduce output significantly.94
This welfare tradeoff argument was an important milestone in
the development of neoliberal antitrust in the American academy,
particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. It was also dovetailed perfectly
with the general neoliberal economic position that favored capital
over labor and lower output over consumer and labor interests.
Bork also ignored the fact that the very output reduction that
harmed consumers harmed labor as well. If an anticompetitive
practice such as the one illustrated in Bork’s figure reduced product
output by half, it very likely reduced the firm’s demand for labor in
proportion. The size of any deadweight loss in the labor market
would depend on the amount of market power that the firm(s) held in
their purchase of labor. The deadweight loss in the labor market must
93

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 107 (2978), providing this illustration:

94

On this point, see Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, supra note
__.
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then be added to the deadweight loss in the product market. Even on
Bork’s very restrictive assumptions, the cost savings would have to
be balanced against the sum of these two sources of deadweight loss.
Below, and superimposed on Bork’s figure, is a very crude
upward sloping supply (marginal outlay) curve indicating
monopsony power over labor,95 and assuming that labor outlay is a
variable cost. Suppression of labor output and price creates a second
deadweight loss triangle. The social cost of Bork’s monopoly should
be calculated as the sum of these two:

One prominent feature of the Williamson\Bork model is that
costs were a black box – a simple horizontal line designated AC1
(pre-merger) or AC2 (post-merger) in the figure with no additional
explanation. These is very odd for a model whose central claims
were about efficiencies. It made no attempt to define or classify
costs, to segregate fixed from variable costs or, to identify the source
of efficiencies, or to say anything about the relationship between
95

Literally, the supply curve in the figure covers the marginal outlay for all
inputs, thus suggesting that labor is the only input this firm requires. That
fact does not affect the point being made here, which is that a reduction of
output in the product market suppresses labor supply. The welfare
consequences for labor are a function of the amount of monopsony power
that the firm holds in the labor market.
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output and costs. The model does not even contain a marginal cost
curve. These omissions are the only way to explain how the figure
could get to an action that reduced output so significantly while yet
producing substantial efficiencies. They also make the model largely
useless as an evaluation tool.
But one thing that seems clear is that any restraint that
reduces output in the product market injures not only consumers via
higher prices, but also labor via fewer jobs or lower wages. Which
injury is greater depends on the amount of market power held on
each side. But injury on both sides always exists unless either the
firm’s product output or its labor input is perfectly competitive.
Limiting Cognizable Labor Harm to Labor Markets

Today when antitrust courts speak about antitrust harm to
labor they are nearly always referring to labor markets. Antitrust
largely refuses to recognize harms to labor that result from restraints
in product markets. Even merger law rarely mentions them, although
then Judge Kavanaugh once suggested that a court consider more
fully whether a hospital merger challenged mainly for output market
effects also caused harm in supplier markets.96 He did not expressly
mention suppliers of labor, such as nurses, but they should clearly be
included.
The law of antitrust standing generally denies it to
employees who claim labor injuries caused by product market
restraints.97 This is so even though no one really doubts that output
96

United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 379-381 (D.C.Cir. 2017)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For good analysis, see Hiba Hafiz, Interagency
Merger Review in Labor Markets, 95 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 37 (2020).
97
See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶352 (5th ed. 2021). See also Feldman v. Am. Dawn, Inc., 849 F.3d 1333
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 322 (2017) (terminated employee lacked
standing to complain of restraint in the product market); Int’l Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Verso Paper Corp., 80 F. Supp. 3d 247
(D. Me. 2015) (employees terminated as a result of merger lacked standing
to obtain antitrust injunction).
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reductions from product market restraints also harm labor. The courts
sometimes cite excessive speculation about causation and damages as
the problem. To be sure, proof problems can be difficult, although
not obviously more difficult than for other elements of injury.98 For
example, a firm driven out of business by an exclusionary practice
can recover the value of its lost business and in some cases even
anticipated lost profits. Why shouldn’t it follow that its terminated
employees can recover for lost employment?99
In fact, employees sometimes suffer more significant
individual injuries from product market restraints than consumers do.
To the extent that job mobility is stickier than consumer mobility,
labor is less able to avoid the harm. Workers also have some
informational advantages over consumers. They often have inside
knowledge about their employers and may be in a better position to
detect antitrust violations than consumers are, or to detect them
earlier.100 Purchasers typically learn of price fixing only after they
have made purchases, and often they never learn at all. On the other
hand, some employees know even when price fixing is in the
planning stage.
Courts are currently divided on the question of antitrust
standing for “whistleblower” employees who were terminated
because they publicized their employers’ product price-fixing
conspiracy. A whistleblower employer may often be in a unique
position as early detector of a cartel, earlier not only than consumers
but even than government enforcers.

98

E.g., Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (proof of injury and damage
would be too speculative for employees of defunct airline allegedly ruined
by defendants).
99
E.g., Adams, supra.
100
See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d 739, 746–47 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985) (granting standing). For a
discussion of the decisions, see 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶352d5 (5th ed. 2021).
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Plaintiff Frank J. Ostrofe, for example, was a middle manager
who was fired because he refused to participate in his employer’s
prospective agreement with rivals to fix the price of labels, which his
employer manufactured.101 Ostrofe was in a better position than any
enforcer, public or private, to reach this conspiracy at an early stage
or before it was even underway. To be sure, Ostrofe did not suffer
reduced wages resulting from a labor market restraint or higher prices
in the product market, but the antitrust laws never assess these
llimitations. Section 4 of the Clayton Act under which Ostrofe sued
provides damages to “any person who shall be injured in his business
or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”102
His injuries clearly fell within the statute.
Employee challenges to product market restraints often face
other problems, particularly for assessing damages. One is directness
and the nature of the injury. If a cartel of manufacturers fixes prices,
consumers are injured by both the price increase and the output
reduction, although antitrust damages are largely limited to the
overcharge. The more immediate impact that accrues to employees
is loss of jobs or perhaps reduced wages, but neither one is an
actionable harm. Employees simply do not have standing to sue for
antitrust violations in product markets.

101

The facts are stated in a previous opinion, 670 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir.
1982):
The conspiracy was effectuated in part by coercing Ostrofe, as
Crocker's sales manager, to rig bids, fix prices, and allocate
markets. When Ostrofe refused to cooperate Crocker's coconspirators complained to Crocker's executive officers who
warned Ostrofe that if he did not participate in the illegal scheme he
would be discharged and prevented from participating in the label
industry in the future. Ostrofe was repeatedly told he would not
receive promised financial compensation or a greater future share
in Crocker's management or income unless he stopped interfering
with the unlawful scheme. He was forced by these threats to resign
his position with Crocker, and was boycotted from further
employment in the labels industry.
102
15 U.S.C. §15 (2018).
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In Associated General Contractors, the leading Supreme
Court decision discussing the issue, the Court defined the scope of
private plaintiff antitrust standing narrowly. The plaintiff, a labor
union, alleged that the members of a trade association of building
contractors conspired not to hire unionized sub-contractors and also
to pressure non-member contractors to do the same thing.103 The
Court cited numerous difficulties with the case’s theory of action,
including the fact that the unionized sub-contractors who were the
direct targets of the boycott were preferable plaintiffs. In his dissent
Justice Marshall found this argument hollow, noting that excluding
unionized contractors from the right to bid in the product market was
simply a way of excluding their employees.104
The Court also noted a problem roughly akin to the one that
indirect purchasers face in damages actions.105 In order to adjudicate
damages the court would have to determine the extent to which the
coerced firms “diverted business away from union subcontractors.”
On top of that it would have to be determined “to what extent those
subcontractors absorbed the damage to their business or passed it on
to employees by reducing the workforce or cutting hours or
wages.”106
While these concerns are not trivial, they do seem overstated.
In order to recover damages an excluded subcontractor would very
likely need to point to projects that it lost as a result of the
anticompetitive exclusion. Each of these would have required a bid
that included a labor component and thus the loss to labor could be
estimated with tolerable accuracy. The very fact that contractors
routinely provide detailed bids for jobs indicate that the labor that
goes into them can be estimated. If it can be estimated with

103

Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (“AGC”)
104
Id. at 537 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105
As in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
106
AGC, supra note __ at 545.
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sufficient accuracy to make a bid under competition, that should give
adequate support to a litigation damages study.107
The secondary concern that the majority cited concerned how
the subcontractor would address this lost labor. It might lay off
workers or refuse to hire them. Conceivably it would pay lower
wages to other workers on jobs that it retained. These all fall into the
general run of difficulties that estimating damages in distribution
markets encounter, and the courts generally respond by permitting
reasonable estimates to go to the fact finder. A nonliability rule, by
contrast, rewards the wrongdoer at the expense of an innocent victim.
In any event, we do not require product purchasers to jump
through the same hoops. We simply permit them to recover based on
the overcharge, typically without inquiry into what avoidance
techniques they might have developed in order to minimize their
harm from the cartel. For example, under the indirect purchaser rule
defendants are not even entitled to object that the purchaser from a
cartel evaded the damage by passing the overcharge on to its own
customers.108 Neither can a defendant complain that the customer
was able to substitute to a product that was almost as good.
The Court also expressed a concern with avoiding duplicative
recoveries.109 However, the excluded sub-contractors and the plaintiff
unions suffered distinct injuries. The excluded union sub-contractors
lost bidding opportunities in the product market for buildings or other
projects. By contrast, the employees represented by the plaintiff
unions lost job opportunities in the labor market. A product cartel
injures consumers but also laborers who produce the cartelized
product. Their injuries are not duplicative, however, and a consumer
award for overcharge damages does not include compensation for the
107

E.g., Industrial Burner Sys., Inc. v. Maxon Corp., 275 F. Supp.2d 878 (E.
D. Mi. 2003) (permitting excluded contractor to submit evidence from lost
bids in support of antitrust damages claim).
108
Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
109
AGC, supra, at 545.
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workers.110 Indeed, it does not even include compensation for
unmade sales that result from the cartel’s product output reduction.
As a result no injury from lost employment duplicated that of
overcharged consumers.
The Court also cited a common bromide in antitrust standing
cases, which was that the plaintiff union “was neither a consumer nor
a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained.”111 But that
conclusion is based on a myopic definition of the “market.” The
business of the allegedly excluded subcontractors was the erection of
structures and the business of the plaintiff was employment in the
same industry.
In some ways the injury that accrues to employees is more
significant than that which accrues to consumers. First of all,
consumers are most often the primary decision makers whose choices
determine output. They are in the best position to evade the
consequences of a cartel by making a substitution. By contrast,
workers merely produce what consumers’ demand.
For example, consumers may respond to a cartel among
videogame makers by purchasing more traditional board games, and
the rate of substitution will be entirely their choice. They can either
pay more for the cartelized product or switch. Further, the typical
consumer at retail is not bound by either a contract or previous
investment to stick with the monopolized product. By contrast, labor
must follow where the consumers lead, and employee movement
from videogame makers to makers of board games could be much
stickier.112
Many employee standing issues for antitrust violations in
product markets reduce to the difficulty of proving causation and
110

The figure above illustrates the point.
AGC, supra, at 539.
112
See Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for
Labor Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 555 (2018).
111
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damages. When the videogame makers fix prices, the inference of
customer harm in that market is relatively straightforward. Proof
problems, particularly of the amount, are typically manageable, even
for indirect purchasers.113 More importantly, we give these
purchasers the benefit of the doubt, not asking whether they passed
on the overcharge or purchased a substitute product. The antitrust
damages rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to a trebled overcharge for
its purchases on the markup between the innocent price and the
unlawful price. The inference of employee loss from the same
product market cartel is strong as well, subject to one additional
inference: employees are injured by the employment consequences
that result from the cartel’s output reduction and do not receive a
wage reduction that is equal to the monopoly overcharge.
This suggests either that the rules for assessing labor damages
need to be loosened up, or else the need for greater public
enforcement. The Justice Department and FTC, unlike private
plaintiffs, need not prove causation and do not need to quantify
damages.114 That gives them a distinct procedural advantage over
private plaintiffs.
Conclusion: Labor Injuries from Product Market Harms

The inverted U-shaped relationship between between antitrust
under- and overenforcement places a premium on correct
outcomes.115 Erring in either direction harms both consumers and
workers. But getting it right requires good and useable theory,
testing and re-testing of outcomes, and an ability to limit one’s focus.

113

On indirect purchaser damages, see 2A PHILLIP A. AREEDA, HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR, AND CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶396 (5th ed. 2021).
114
See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Harm and Causation, supra note __.
115
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
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The original Progressives were supportive of labor and were
critical to the development of the field of labor economics116 as well
as the antitrust law governing labor disputes.117 Today’s new
Progressives, or neo-Brandeisians, are also quite solicitous of labor,
and they certainly support such things as ramped up antitrust
enforcement against overly aggressive noncompete agreements, as
well as more traditional areas of wage fixing. While those concerns
are welcome, they also have a blind spot, which is their lack of
attentiveness to the impact of product restraints on labor.
The effect of employment market restraints, while surely
important, is less substantial than the effect of reduced output in
product markets. Roughly 18% of American workers are covered by
some sort of noncompete agreement.118 That number includes both
noncompetes that are justified by traditional employer-investment
and free rider concerns as well as those that are not. What part of the
employment market is subject to anti-poaching or other horizontal
116

E.g., SOLOMON BLUM, LABOR ECONOMICS (1925); JOHN R. COMMONS,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924); JOHN R. COMMONS, LABOR
AND ADMINISTRATION (1913); FREDERICK W. TAUSSIG, WAGES AND
CAPITAL: AN EXAMINATION OF THE WAGES FUND DOCTRINE (1900);
RICHARD T. ELY, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1886) See also
CLARENCE E. WUNDERLIN, JR., VISIONS OF A NEW INDUSTRIAL ORDER:
SOCIAL SCIENCE AND LABOR THEORY IN AMERICA’S PROGRESSIVE ERA
(1992); Robert E. Prasch, American Economists and Minimum Wage
legislation During the Progressive Era, 1912-1923, 20 J. HIST. ECON.
THOUGHT 161 (1998).
117
The largely includes Justice Brandeis himself. See, e.g. Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 479 (1921) (dissenting from majority
approval of a labor injunction against strikers); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312 (1921) (dissenting from decision striking down Arizona statute that
prohibited labor injunctions). See Felix Frankfurter & Nathan Greene,
Legislation Affecting Labor Injunctions, 38 YALE L.J. 879 (1929). On the
Progressives’ contributions to antitrust policy generally, see Herbert
Hovenkamp, Progressives and the Invention of Antitrust (Penn. L. & Econ.
Working
Paper,
2022),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3995502.
118
Evan P. Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman D. Bishara, Noncompete
Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force, 64 J. L. & ECON. 53 (2021).
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wage fixing agreements is hard to say.119 However, all of labor has a
stake in the size of the product market. A practice that results in
reduced product output harms labor just as certainly as it harms
consumers – and perhaps more to the extent that substitution and
monopoly avoidance techniques often work less well in labor
markets than in consumer markets. Finally, as noted earlier, antitrust
rules that result in reduced product output can apply to the entire
domain of commerce – much broader than an instance of market
power exercised by a firm or even a cartel.120
Today “consumer welfare” as an antitrust goal has been
placed under attack.121 How much is based on Bork’s distorted
conception of that term or how much on disregard of consumer
interests is unclear.122 To the extent it is the latter, however, it favors
small business over consumers. It also favors small business over
labor.
Consumer welfare when it is properly defined and worker
welfare travel in tandem. When a practice harms consumers by
raising prices and reducing output, it harms labor as well. There is no
a priori reason for thinking that worker harm is less severe than

119

For some good speculation, see Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner,
Horizontal Collusion and Parallel Wage-Setting in Labor Markets (SSRN
Jan.
2022),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4008687; and also
Eric A. Posner, Antitrust and Labor Markets: A Reply to Richard Epstein,
15 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 389 (2022) (replying to Richard A. Epstein, The
Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and Now, 15 N.Y.U.
J.L. & LIBERTY 327 (2022)).
120
See discussion supra, text at notes __.
121
E.g., Sandeep Vaheesan, The Profound Nonsense of Consumer Welfare
Antitrust, 64 ANTITRUST BULL. 479 (2019); Barry C. Lynn, Killing the
Competition: How the New Monopolies are Destroying Open Markets
(Harpers, Feb. 2012), available at
https://harpers.org/archive/2012/02/killing-the-competition/
122
See Salop, supra note __.
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consumer harm.123 A properly designed antitrust policy must focus
on both sets of interests.

123

Naidu, Posner & Weyl, supra note __ at 560-561.
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